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Bordering the Constitution, Constituting 
the Border
EFRAT ARBEL*
It is an established principle in Canadian law that refugees present at or within Canada’s 
borders are entitled to basic constitutional protection. Where precisely these borders lie, 
however, is far from clear. In this article, I examine the Canadian border as a site at which to 
study the constitutional entitlements of refugees. Through an analysis of the Multiple Borders 
Strategy (MBS)a broad strategy that re-charts Canada’s borders for the purposes of 
enhanced migration regulationI point to a basic tension at play in the border as site. I argue 
that the MBS imagines and enacts the border in two fundamentally different ways. On one 
hand, it conceives of the border as a multiple, moving barrier that can be selectively positioned 
outside Canada’s territorial boundaries to expand state power outward. On the other hand 
and at the same time, it conceives of the border as a singular and static barrier positioned 
at the edge of Canadian territory and asserts this as the “actual” border. By simultaneously 
conceiving of the border in these two conflicting waysand maintaining that Canada’s 
extraterritorial borders are not its actual bordersthe MBS frustrates a basic principle of 
Canadian constitutional law. It not only deprives refugees of constitutional protection but 
also, more fundamentally, of legal and constitutional recognition. To illuminate the legal and 
conceptual violence of the MBS, I turn to the work of Hannah Arendt on the “right to have 
rights.” By reference to Arendt’s work, I argue that the MBS not only re-charts Canada’s 
national boundary, it also alters the juridical relationships produced by that boundary and 
the rights and duties they prescribe. I conclude by advocating for better alignment between 
Canada’s constitutional commitments and its border laws and policies. I argue that to give 
meaning to the right to have rights within Canada’s constitutional framework and to ensure 
that those subject to the force of Canadian law may also benefit from its protection, Canada 
must ensure that wherever its legal borders go the constitution follows.
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Un principe juridique bien établi au Canada veut que l’on accorde une protection 
constitutionnelle de base aux réfugiés qui se trouvent au Canada ou à ses frontières. 
L’emplacement exact de ces frontières est toutefois loin d’être clair. Dans cet article, 
j’examine la frontière canadienne comme lieu où peut se dérouler une étude des droits 
constitutionnels des réfugiés. Par le biais d’une analyse de la stratégie des frontières 
multiples (SFM)—vaste stratégie qui redéfinit les frontières canadiennes dans le but 
de faciliter les procédures d’immigration—je souligne une tension fondamentale qui se 
manifeste quant à l’emplacement de la frontière. Je prétends que la SFM imagine et met en 
œuvre la frontière de deux manières fondamentalement différentes. Elle se représente d’une 
part la frontière comme un continuum de points mobiles de contrôle qu’il devient possible de 
situer à l’extérieur du territoire canadien afin d’étendre hors de nos frontières les pouvoirs de 
l’État. Dans un même temps, elle se représente d’autre part la frontière comme une barrière 
singulière et statique située à la limite du territoire canadien, barrière qu’elle considère être 
la « véritable » frontière. En considérant simultanément la frontière de ces deux manières 
conflictuelles—et en affirmant que les frontières extraterritoriales du Canada ne sont pas 
ses véritables frontières – la SFM déroge à un principe fondamental de la loi constitutionnelle 
du Canada. Non seulement prive-t-elle ainsi les réfugiés de leur protection constitutionnelle 
mais également, de manière plus fondamentale, de leur reconnaissance constitutionnelle. 
Pour jeter un éclairage sur la violence juridique et conceptuelle de la SFM, je me tourne 
vers le « droit d’avoir des droits » qui se dégage de l’œuvre de Hannah Arendt. Emboîtant le 
pas avec elle, je prétends que la SFM non seulement redéfinit la frontière du Canada, mais 
encore transforme les relations juridiques qui émanent de cette frontière, de même que 
les droits et les responsabilités qu’elles entraînent. En conclusion, je plaide en faveur d’un 
meilleur alignement des lois et des politiques frontalières du Canada sur ses engagements 
constitutionnels. Afin que le droit d’avoir des droits ait un sens dans le cadre constitutionnel 
du Canada et pour permettre à ceux qui sont assujettis à l’impact des lois canadiennes de 
bénéficier également de leur protection, je prétends que le Canada doit faire en sorte que sa 
constitution s’applique où que se déplacent ses frontières juridiques.
IN THE FALL OF 2015, the haunting photo of three-year-old Alan Kurdi’s drowned 
body on the Turkish shores forced Canadians to contend with the gravity of 
the global refugee crisis. The Kurdi family’s link to Canada—a Canadian aunt 
who sought to sponsor the family’s refugee claim—exposed Canada’s failure to 
respond to this crisis. With the election of its new government, Canada launched 
an unprecedented effort to open its borders and resettle tens of thousands of 
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Syrian refugees,1 gaining international praise for its efforts. The Chief of the 
United Nations hailed Canada for its “compassionate leadership and generosity,”2 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees celebrated Canada as “exemplary,”3 
and The New York Times praised Canada for its compassion in contrast with the 
“callous and irresponsible behavior” of the United States.4
Canada’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis is indeed commendable, and 
illustrative of a longstanding tradition of Canadian generosity and leadership 
in refugee protection.5 Canada has long been celebrated both for the fairness of 
its laws and the generosity of its people and has, over the years, been praised for 
setting an example that “raised the standards of refugee protection worldwide.”6 
But, as Canada opens its borders to certain refugees it also closes its borders 
to others. Notwithstanding its generous resettlement efforts, Canada has for 
decades deployed substantial resources and engaged significant efforts to keep 
refugees away from its shores. It achieves this through a series of interdiction 
and interception measures enacted under the rubric of the Multiple Borders 
Strategy (MBS), a broad strategy that re-charts Canada’s borders for the purposes 
of enhanced migration regulation. The MBS’s stated goal is to “push the border 
1. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) reports that between 4 November 2015 and 8 
May 2016, a total of 27,005 Syrian refugees were admitted to Canada. This figure consists of 
15,412 government-assisted refugees, 2,405 blended visa-office referred refugees, and 9,763 
privately sponsored refugees. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “#WelcomeRefugees: 
Key Figures”, online: < http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/milestones.asp>.
2. Giuseppe Valiante, “UN Chief Praises Canada’s Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis”, 
CTV News (12 February 2016) online: CTV News <www.ctvnews.ca/canada/
un-chief-praises-canada-s-response-to-syrian-refugee-crisis-1.2775923>.
3. “Canada’s Refugee Model Praised by UN High Commissioner”, CBC Radio (22 March 2016) 
online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.3502370/
canada-s-refugee-model-praised-by-un-high-commissioner-1.3502379>.
4. “Canada’s Warm Embrace of Refugees”, Editorial, The New York Times (11 December 
2015) online: The New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/opinion/
canadas-warm-embrace-of-refugees.html?_r=0>.
5. In 1986, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees awarded the “people 
of Canada” the prestigious Nansen Refugee Award, awarded annually in recognition 
of outstanding work on behalf of the forcibly displaced. See United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, “Archive of Past Nansen Winners” online: <http://www.
unhcr.org/subsites/nansen/4ad5dc559/1986-people-canada.html?query=people%20of%20
canada%20nansen>. Canada has also been the subject of much-deserved criticism. See e.g. 
Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics 
of Refugee Exclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinic, 2013).
6. Ibid at 104; Testimony of Deborah E Anker, Director, Harvard Immigration and Refugee 
Clinic. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 
Evidence, 39th Leg, 1st Sess, No 33 (8 Feb 2007).
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out”—outside Canada’s geographic perimeter—to keep refugees and other 
so-called undesirable travellers away from Canada’s territorial frontiers and block 
them from seeking asylum.7
In this paper, I examine Canada’s response to global displacement beyond 
the Syrian refugee crisis and focus instead on its treatment of refugees along its 
borders. My analysis centres on the MBS and, more specifically, its impact on 
the legal and constitutional rights of refugees. I argue that by redrawing Canada’s 
borders the MBS subverts a core principle in Canadian law—established by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration)8—namely, that refugees who are physically present at or within the 
Canadian border are entitled to basic protection under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.9 Highlighting a basic contradiction in the conceptual underpinnings 
of the MBS, I argue that the MBS constitutes the border in two opposing ways. 
On one hand, it enacts the border as a singular, static line positioned along 
Canada’s territorial perimeter and asserts this as the “actual” border.10 On the 
other hand, and at the same time, the MBS enacts the border as a multiple, 
moving barrier that protrudes outside state territory and asserts this as the legal 
border.11 Since Canadian law limits the Charter’s extraterritorial application, this 
dual understanding of the border undermines the core principle outlined in Singh: 
it delinks the reciprocal connection Singh draws between refugees’ amenability 
to Canadian law and their ability to claim its protection, and also places refugees 
who are present at Canada’s asserted legal border beyond the Charter’s reach.
7. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House 
of Commons, Chapter 5, Citizenship and Immigration Control and Enforcement (2003) at 
8, online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/20030405ce.pdf> [OAG 2003 Report], 
8. See also Canada Border Services Agency, Strategy and Coordination Branch, Admissibility 
Screening and Supporting Intelligence Activities: Evaluation Study (July 2009) online: <https://
web.archive.org/web/20150911191357/http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/
reports-rapports/ae-ve/2009/assia-aeasr-eng.html> [CBSA, Admissibility Study]; Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada, Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing 
(2003), preamble at para 3, online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/smu/
smu-ins-dos.asp> [CIC, Statement of Mutual Understanding].
8. [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422 [Singh].
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
10. CBSA, Admissibility Study, supra note 7.
11. For an analysis of how states shift their borders for the purposes of enhanced migration 
regulation, see Leanne Weber, “The Shifting Frontiers of Migration Control” in Sharon 
Pickering & Leanne Weber, eds, Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2006) 21; Ayelet Shachar, “The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation” (2008) 
30:3 Mich J Int’l L 809.
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I begin this article with an overview of the Singh decision. I then examine 
the MBS in detail and analyze its operation and effect. To highlight the legal and 
conceptual violence of the MBS, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s writing on the “right 
to have rights,”12 which has become foundational to scholarly understanding of 
the limits of law in protecting refugee rights. By reference to Arendt’s writing, 
I argue that the MBS not only deprives refugees of basic rights, it also denies 
them fundamental legal and constitutional recognition under Canadian law. 
As a result, it suspends refugees in an exceptional state, wherein they are subject 
to the force of Canadian law but unable to benefit from its protection. After 
canvassing the problems with this approach, I conclude by advocating for a better 
alignment between Canada’s constitutional commitments and its border laws 
and policies. I argue that if Canada’s stated commitment to protect refugees is to 
have normative force, it must be applied consistently. Following Singh, Canada 
must ensure that those subject to the force of its laws may also benefit from the 
law’s protection. This means that Canada must avoid disingenuous policies that 
purport to extend constitutional protection to the border but enact the border 
in ways that exceed the Charter’s application. Simply put, I argue that wherever 
Canada’s legal borders go, the constitution must follow.
I. THE PROMISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTION
Singh lies at the heart of Canada’s refugee determination system. As Catherine 
Dauvergne explains, the decision forms “part of the mythic foundation of 
Canadian refugee law,” with the date of its release still celebrated annually as 
Refugee Rights Day by the refugee advocacy community.13 Singh involved a 
12. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1967) [Arendt, 
Origins] at 297.
13. Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing 
Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill LJ 663 at 669 
[Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens”]. For an example of the celebration 
of Refugee Rights Days within the refugee advocacy community, see Canadian Council for 
Refugees, “Refugee Rights Day April 4” online: <ccrweb.ca/en/refugee-rights-day>. For early 
praise of the Singh decision, see e.g. Donald Galloway, “The Extraterritorial Application of 
the Charter to Visa Applicants” (1991) 23:2 Ottawa L Rev 335 at 337 (stating that Singh 
obliges Canada to treat refugees at or within its borders “with much the same respect that 
it accorded to its own citizens and permanent residents”); F Pearl Eliadis, “The Swing 
from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in Immigration Law” (1995) 26 
Imm LR (2d) 130 (stating that Singh strengthened “the trend towards ensuring that the 
newest members of our society as well as those seeking entry to Canada are treated in a way 
that is consonant with the way Canadians except to be treated themselves”); Julius Grey, 
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section 7 Charter challenge to the refugee determination procedure in place 
at the time. The applicants were all foreign nationals who applied for refugee 
protection in Canada but were found not to satisfy the definition of “refugee” set 
out in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and were 
consequently deemed ineligible for protection.14 They argued that the procedure 
by which their status was assessed—which at no point involved an oral hearing on 
the merits—violated their rights under section 7 of the Charter, which guarantees 
“everyone … the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.”15 More specifically, they argued that in the absence of an oral hearing, 
the determination procedure did not provide them with “a fair opportunity to 
present their refugee status claims or to know the case they had to meet.”16
“Comment on Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration” (1986) 31:3 McGill LJ 
496 at 506 (praising Singh as a “major step forward in immigration law, human rights law 
and administrative law”). For an example of the criticism directed at the Singh decision after 
its release, see e.g. Estanislao Oziewicz, “Manning Plays Down Immigration Policy: Reform 
Party Literature Advocates Harsher Restrictions” Globe and Mail (15 July 1991) A6, cited in 
Sean Rehaag, Bordering on Legality: An Investigation into the Lines ‘We’ Draw / the Lines that 
Draw ‘Us’ (and the Spaces in Between) (JSD Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 
2008) [unpublished] at 71, n 42. Oziewicz reported that Preston Manning, then leader of 
the Reform Party of Canada, said that the Charter’s override (notwithstanding) clause should 
be invoked to get around the Singh decision.
14. Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 2545, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 
606 UNTS 8791 [Refugee Convention]. Article 1(A)(2) defines a refugee as a person “who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.” Canadian law incorporates this definition almost verbatim into the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 96 [IRPA].
15. Charter, supra note 9, s 7; Singh, supra note 9 at paras 3-5, 23-25.
16. Singh, supra note 9 at para 33.
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Before the Court could entertain the Charter claim, it had to determine 
whether the Charter even applied in the circumstances of the case.17 Some of 
the applicants had lodged their refugee claims at ports of entry, which raised the 
threshold question of whether section 7 of the Charter extends to non-citizens 
at the border. Answering this question in the affirmative, Singh decided that the 
word “everyone” in section 7 includes “every human being who is physically 
present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law,” 
including refugees.18 Importantly and in contrast with other jurisdictions, Singh 
extended such protection to refugees who are physically present not only within 
but also at Canada’s borders, without distinguishing between those who seek 
and those who have secured entry into the state.19 It also extended section 7 
protection both to citizens and non-citizens, without distinguishing between the 
17. Notably, only three of the six justices that decided SinghWilson J, with Dickson CJC and 
Lamer J concurringrelied on the Charter in their reasons. Beetz, Estey, and McIntyre JJ 
based their decision on the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44. As Dauvergne explains, 
this fact has been lost in Singh’s mythology, and it is Justice Wilson’s decision “that has stood 
the test of time and crystallized into what Singh stands for.” Dauvergne, “How the Charter 
Has Failed Non-Citizens”, supra note 13 at 670-71. See e.g. Suresh v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 at para 113 (citing Wilson J’s 
decision as authoritative for its interpretation of section 7 and for the proposition that the 
principles of fundamental justice demand, at a minimum, compliance with common law 
requirements of procedural fairness). For subsequent application of Wilson J’s judgment, see 
also infra notes 23-28.
18. Singh, supra note 9 at para 35.
19. Singh, supra note 9 at paras 53-54. With this finding, Justice Wilson explicitly rejected the 
US approach that would have extended Charter protection to refugees only when present 
within state borders. She identified two core objections to this approach. First, she held that 
a rule “which provided Charter protection to refugees who succeeded in entering the country 
but not to those who were seeking admission at a port of entry would be to reward those 
who sought to evade the operation of our immigration laws over those who presented their 
cases openly at the first available opportunity.” Second, she found that the US approach 
did not properly “differentiate between the special status accorded to Convention refugees 
who are present in this country and the status of other individuals who are seeking to enter 
or remain in Canada,” and thus could not be upheld under Canadian law. Contrast, for 
example, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Zadvydas v Davis, 533 
US 678 at 693, 121 S Ct 2491 (2001) (finding that “the Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 
unlawful, temporary, or permanent” [emphasis added]).
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presence or absence of immigration status.20 Rejecting distinctions based both on 
territory and immigration status, Singh stated that it would be “unthinkable” to 
subject refugees to the force of Canadian law without also extending them the 
benefit of its protection.21 In doing so, Singh explicitly embraced refugees who 
are physically present at Canada’s borders within the ambit of Charter protection.
Despite its early promise, Singh has failed to secure refugees expansive rights 
protection under the Charter.22 Courts have since narrowed its application, as for 
example in Medovarski v Canada where the Court held that the deportation of a 
non-citizen does not engage section 7 of the Charter. The Court later clarified in 
Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) that “[w]hile the deportation 
of a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage section 7 of 
the Charter, some features associated with deportation, such as detention in the 
course of the certificate process or the prospect of deportation to torture, may 
do so.”23 The Court further held in Dehghani v Canada that non-citizens do not 
20. For additional analysis, see Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens”, supra 
note 13 at 672, suggesting that the Supreme Court of Canada’s early decisions fit “squarely 
within the trend … of human rights eclipsing citizenship rights as an aspect of contemporary 
globalization.” Specifically, Dauvergne references Saskia Sassen’s suggestion that the rise of 
human rights protection means that distinctions in rights protection are not drawn between 
citizens and non-citizens but between those with secure immigration status and those 
without status. See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Dauvergne posits that by extending the 
Charter to persons “physically present” in Canada, the Singh decision “eclipses even Sassen’s 
analysis of the importance of immigration status.” Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed 
Non-Citizens”, supra note 13 at 673.
21. In Justice Wilson’s words, it would be “unthinkable that the Charter would not apply 
to entitle them to fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.” Singh, supra 
note 9 at para 52.
22. See e.g. Marc Gold, “Constitutional Scholarship in Canada” (1985) 23:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 
495 at 513 (stating that the long-term impact of Singh on immigration law “is likely to be 
minimal”). See also Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick 
Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 383 at 394 [Macklin, “Borderline Security”] 
(noting that “while it is technically true that most Charter rights apply to all persons 
physically in Canada, in practice the courts have sharply circumscribed the nature and extent 
of those rights for non-citizens faced with removal” [citations omitted]).
23. Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51, [2005] 2 SCR 539; Charkaoui v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 351 [Charkaoui] at para. 17.
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have a right to counsel at port-of-entry examinations,24 and noted later in B010 v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), albeit in obiter, that section 7 
interests are not engaged at the early stage of refugee protection proceedings where 
the claimant still has access to a pre-removal risk assessment.25 The Federal Court 
of Appeal has similarly narrowed Singh’s application, stating in Nguyen v Canada 
that denying individuals with serious criminal convictions access to the refugee 
determination system is constitutionally valid.26 Most recently in Savunthararasa 
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), however, citing 
Singh, the Federal Court of Appeal asked whether a “more expansive approach to 
security of the person should be taken.”27
Notwithstanding these findings, and in cases not involving the prospect of 
removal, Singh’s central principle endures: refugees present at or within Canada’s 
borders are entitled to basic protection under the Charter.28 Thus, in Toussaint v 
Canada the Federal Court held that after Singh there is “no debate that non-citizens 
in Canada, including illegal immigrants, are entitled to the protections of s. 7 of the 
Charter,” and that “all human beings, regardless of their immigration status, are 
entitled to dignity and the protection of their fundamental right to life, liberty 
and security of the person.”29 The Immigration Appeal Board in Sethi v Canada 
similarly cited Singh for the proposition that the protection of section 7 “is not 
restricted to Canadian citizens and permanent residents but refers to any person 
24. Dehghani v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] 1 SCR 1053, 101 DLR 
(4th) 654. See also Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 
SCR 711, 90 DLR (4th) 289 (where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the deportation 
of long-term permanent residents who commit crimes is constitutionally valid). For a 
complete discussion, see Dauvergne, supra note 13 (analyzing how Singh has failed to secure 
non-citizens with meaningful rights protection under the Charter).
25. B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58, [2015] SCJ No 58 
[B010], at para 75.
26. Nguyen v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] 1 FC 696, 18 Imm LR 
(2d) 165 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1993] 3 SCR viii.
27. Savunthararasa v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness); Peter v 
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FCA 51, [2016] FCJ No 
173 at para 28 [Savunthararasa]. Notably in this case, the Federal Court of Appeal refused to 
answer whether the impugned bar on pre-removal risk assessments violation of section 7 of 
the Charter on the basis that there was insufficient evidence before it to decide the claim.
28. See Singh, supra note 9 at paras 20, 56, 79, 101-02. But see Macklin, “Borderline Security”, 
supra note 22 for critique.
29. Toussaint v Canada (Attorney General) (2010), [2011] 4 FCR 367 at para 87, [2010] FCJ 
No 987 (QL), aff’d 2011 FCA 213, [2013] 1 FCR 374 (finding no section 7 violation and 
stating further that non-citizens who have violated Canadian immigration laws are not 
entitled to remain in Canada or claim the protection of its laws).
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL833
whose life, liberty or security is infringed provided that person is in Canada.”30 
The Quebec Superior Court in Noor v Canada further confirmed that in Singh, 
the Supreme Court of Canada decided that refugee claimants are “entitled to 
the protection of those sections of the Charter which refer to ‘everyone’,”31 and 
in Bah v Canada cited Singh for the principle that “every human being who is 
physically present in Canada is entitled to the protection and rights afforded by 
the Charter.”32 Other courts have cited Singh for similar principles33 and have also 
extended refugees protection beyond that outlined under section 7.34
The broad impact of the Singh decision is more significant than the case law 
suggests. Singh does much more than extend refugees the right to fundamental 
justice in the adjudication of their claim. It also extends refugees basic legal 
and constitutional recognition under Canadian law. Singh effectively enacts 
30. Sethi v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 10 Imm LR (2d) 251, [1989] 
IADD No 49 (QL) at para 26.
31. Noor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] QJ No 722 at para 70 
(QL) (Sup Ct (Civ Div)).
32. Bah v Canada (Minister of Manpower and of Immigration), [1989] QJ No 2470 at para 
46 (QL) (Sup Ct).
33. See e.g. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Borowski (TD), [1990] 2 FC 
728 at para 19, [1990] FCJ No 132 (QL) (stating that Singh “put it beyond any further 
social or academic discussion that any person physically present in Canada was entitled to the 
whole panoply of rights and freedoms available under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” 
and further that a port-of-entry refugee claimant may be in “greater jeopardy than an inland 
claimant” and may therefore be entitled to a greater scope of rights protection including, 
for example, the right to counsel). Notably, Singh makes clear that refugees and other 
non-citizens are not entitled to certain Charter rights, such as those reserved only for citizens. 
See also Slahi v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2009 FC 160 at para 47, 340 FTR 236 [Slahi] 
(emphasizing that section 7 protection “may be available to non-Canadians when they are 
physically present in Canada”); Kofitse v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2002 FCT 894 at para 22, [2002] FCJ No 1168 (QL) (citing Singh in stating that it has 
“already been determined that Convention refugees are entitled to fundamental justice in 
the adjudication of their status”); Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Fast 
(TD), 2001 FCT 1269 at para 30, 208 DLR (4th) 729 (citing Singh in stating that “refugee 
claimants are entitled to the benefit of section 7 of the Charter”); Xu v Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration), 79 FTR 107 at para 13, 25 Imm LR (2d) 120 (stating 
that since Singh, “there is no longer any question that refugee claimants are entitled to 
fundamental justice in the determination of whether they are Convention refugees”).
34. See e.g. Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651, 
[2015] 2 FCR 267 (finding that federal government cuts to refugee health care violate the 
Charter’s section 15 equality guarantee and its section 12 prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
treatment”); YZ v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892, [2015] 
FCJ No 880 (QL) (finding that a bar on appeals for refugees from “Designated Countries of 
Origin” violates the Charter’s section 15 equality guarantee).
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the Canadian border as a site of rights protection for refugees—a site at which 
they are recognized as juridical actors entitled to a limited but actionable rights 
claim against the state.35 It does so by drawing a reciprocal connection between 
a refugee’s physical presence on Canadian soil, her amenability to Canadian law, 
and her ability to benefit from its protection.36 Since such amenability extends 
only as far as the Canadian border, understanding precisely where the border lies 
is essential for understanding the limits and possibilities of this legal principle.
II. SHIFTING THE BORDER, RESTRICTING RIGHTS
In the years since Singh, the legal landscape of the Canadian border has changed 
dramatically and with it the application of the Singh principle. In finding that the 
protection of the Charter extends to “every human being who is physically present 
in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law,”37 the Court 
in Singh imagined the nation-state as a clearly bounded entity and presumed 
a direct, coterminous correlation between state, territory, and authority—
three central building blocks of the nation-state.38 It further constituted the 
border as a stable and static line located along Canada’s geographic perimeter, 
clearly delineating both the edge of the territory and the bounds of Canada’s 
constitutional reach.
This approach is, however, out of step with the current legal and material 
realities of the Canadian border. Canada has redesigned its borders through a 
series of domestic measures, bilateral agreements with the United States, and 
35. For an analysis of how the Canadian border has been reconstituted as a site of punishment 
for refugees through the enactment of the “Designated Foreign National” regime, see Efrat 
Arbel, “Between Protection and Punishment: The Irregular Arrival Regime in Canadian 
Refugee Law” in Keramet Reiter & Alexa Koenig, eds, Extreme Punishment: Comparative 
Studies in Detention, Incarceration, and Solitary Confinement (London: Palgrave, 2015) 197.
36. More specifically, Singh presents physical presence at or within the border as the triggering 
criterion that makes refugees amenable to Canadian law. It is this amenability, as Galloway 
explains, that is the “salient factor.” See Galloway, supra note 13 at 339 (suggesting further 
that Wilson J’s decision can be read as establishing the principle that “everyone who is 
amenable to Canadian law, whether or not they find themselves in Canada, is embraced by 
the relevant sections of the Charter”). But see infra notes 77-78.
37. Singh, supra note 9 at para 35.
38. See Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006) (identifying territory, authority, and rights as core 
components that make up any society in any age, and examining how these components 
have changedin themselves and in their interrelationshipsacross medieval, national, and 
global assemblages).
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international agreements with other states.39 These instruments establish a 
complex matrix of legal measures designed to combat terrorism, enhance security, 
collect and share biometric data, facilitate trade and travel, and restrict migration. 
Unconstrained by geographic specificity, these measures can be selectively 
positioned in multiple locations far removed from Canada’s territorial boundary 
line. Their implementation reconstitutes Canada’s border as a “smart” border that 
extends to both territorial and extraterritorial locations and, as Leanne Weber 
explains, is asserted differently “in relation to different groups of border crossers.”40
Chief among these measures is the MBS, discussed briefly above, through 
which Canada re-charts its borders for the purposes of enhanced migration 
regulation. The MBS is described most clearly in the preamble to the 2003 
Statement of Mutual Understanding between Canada and the United States:
Recognizing that moving the focus of control of the movement of people away 
from our shared land border to overseas, where potential violators of citizenship 
or immigration laws are interdicted prior to their arrival in the United States and 
Canada, enables Canada and the United States to manage more effectively their 
movement into and within North America. Canada and the United States are 
pursuing a regional approach to migration based on the Multiple Borders Strategy … 
At every checkpoint along the travel continuum — visa screening; airport check-in; 
39. Principal among these is the US and Canada Smart Border Declaration (2001) online: 
<www.legislationline.org/documents/id/7543>. The Smart Border Declaration was signed 
by the parties in December 2001 to enhance border security and border control. See also 
Public Safety Canada, “Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan” online: <https://web.
archive.org/web/20130412191938/http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/bs/sbdap-eng.
aspx>. In February 2003, Canada and the United States also signed a Statement of Mutual 
Understanding outlining 16 articles to enhance co-operation and collaboration between 
Canada and the United States with respect to information sharing in relation to border 
security and border management. Statement of Mutual Understanding, supra note 7. 
In August 2003, the parties signed an Asylum Annex to extend the Statement of Mutual 
Understanding’s application and facilitate information sharing in asylum matters. See Annex 
Regarding the Sharing of Information on Asylum and Refugee Status Claims to the Statement 
of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing, US-Canada, 18 September 2003, online: 
<www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/smu/smu-ins-annex1.asp> [Asylum Annex]. 
In February 2011, the parties issued Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter 
Security and Economic Competitiveness (2011) online: <actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/bbg-tpf/
beyond-border-action-plan>. It was designed to enhance border security and economic 
competitiveness based on a “perimeter approach,” which allows the parties to work together 
both at and beyond the border. More recently, the parties signed the Agreement on Land, 
Rail, Marine, and Air Transport Preclearance Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada (2015), online: <www.dhs.gov/news/2015/03/16/
united-states-and-canada-sign-preclearance-agreement>.
40. Weber, supra note 10 at 23.
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points of embarkation; transit points; international airports and seaports; and the 
Canada-United States border — there is an opportunity for the Participants to link 
the person and the document and any known intelligence.41
The MBS serves several legitimate and compelling objectives ranging from the 
preservation of national security to intelligence gathering to crime control. With 
respect to refugees, however, it is applied as an interdiction measure designed to 
stem asylum flows offshore. While questionable in their legality, such interdiction 
measures take advantage of what Sean Rehaag describes as a gap in the protection 
offered to refugees by the Refugee Convention.42 As Rehaag explains, because 
persons are legally defined as “refugees” only when they leave their countries of 
origin, and because the Convention’s prohibition on refoulement—the forcible 
return of refugees to a country where they are likely to be persecuted—applies 
only to refugees who are physically located in the territory of a host state, the 
rights of refugees in transit can more easily be violated or ignored.43
Under the rubric of the MBS, Canada has enacted various measures designed 
to exploit this gap in protection. These measures are applied with the explicit aim 
of blocking refugees “as far away from North America as possible”—before they 
set foot on Canadian soil and trigger the protections outlined in Singh.44 The MBS 
achieves this aim by quite literally redrawing Canada’s borders in order to “push 
the border out.”45 Citizenship and Immigration Canada represents this redrawing 
as a series of concentric rings radiating out from the territorial border (Figure 1).
Figure 1 fundamentally reconceptualizes both the location and operation 
of the Canadian border. It conceives of the border not as a singular static line 
positioned at the edge of territory—in keeping with the approach adopted in 
Singh—but rather as a moving line that can be selectively positioned in multiple 
locations at once. Significantly, the MBS also de-territorializes the border by 
redefining it as “any point at which the identity of the traveller can be verified.”46 
To this end, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) explains that the 
MBS “views the border not as a geo-political line but rather a continuum of 
41. Statement of Mutual Understanding, supra note 7, preamble at para 3.
42. Rehaag, supra note 13 at 88.
43. Ibid. But see Penelope Mathew, “Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa” 
(2002) 96:3 AJIL 661 at 666 (arguing that extraterritorial interception is not generally 
accepted as permissible).
44. OAG 2003 Report, supra note 7 at 8.
45. CBSA Admissibility Study, supra note 7 at “Overview of CBSA Admissibility Screening and 
Supporting Intelligence Activities.”
46. OAG 2003 Report, supra note 7 at 8.
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checkpoints along a route of travel from the country of origin to Canada or the 
United States.”47
Canada is not alone in redrawing its borders in this manner. As Ayelet 
Shachar explains, the “firm borderlines drawn in the world atlas do not necessarily 
coincide with those adhered to, indeed created through, immigration law and 
policy. Instead … the location of the border is shifting—at times penetrating into 
the interior, in other circumstances extending beyond the edge of the territory.”48 
Étienne Balibar’s description is apt:
[S]ometimes noisily and sometimes sneakily, borders have changed place. 
Whereas traditionally, and in conformity with both their judicial definition and 
“cartographical” representation as incorporated into national memory, they should 
be at the edge of the territory, marking the point where it ends, it seems that borders 
and the institutional practices corresponding to them have been transported into the 
middle of political space.49
As Balibar maintains, laws and policies that push the border into the “middle 
of political space” also alter the juridical relationships that the border prescribes.50 
How we think about and institute the border is central to how we think about 
political association and juridical status: “[I]t is the working of the border … 
which constitutes, or ‘produces’ the stranger/foreigner as a social type.”51 Indeed, 
laws enacted pursuant to the “moving border paradigm,” as Huyen Pham terms 
47. Statement of Mutual Understanding, supra note 7, preamble at para 3.
48. Shachar, supra note 10 at 810 [emphasis in original removed]. For further discussion, see 
e.g. Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 6-7 (noting that the “growing (though uneven) 
permeability of national borders, often described under the rubric of ‘globalization,’ has 
become axiomatic in much social and economic scholarship”); Karine Côté-Boucher, “The 
Diffuse Border: Intelligence-Sharing, Control and Confinement along Canada’s Smart 
Border” (2003) 5:2 Surveillance & Society 142; Alison Mountz, “Spectres at the Port of 
Entry: Understanding State Mobilities through an Ontology of Exclusion” (2011) 6:3 
Mobilities 317.
49. Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 2004) at 109 [emphasis in original]. For further discussion of 
the meaning of “political space,” see Étienne Balibar, “Europe as Borderland” (2009) 27:2 
Society and Space 190 (explaining that the concept of “political space” examines relationship 
between the constitution of political power and the control of space, and analyzing the 
notion through, inter alia, a consideration of political spaces, borders, and citizenship).
50. Étienne Balibar, “Europe as Borderland” (The Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in Human 
Geography, delivered at the University of Nijmegen, 10 November 2004) at 16, online: 
<gpm.ruhosting.nl/avh/Europe%20as%20Borderland.pdf>.
51. Ibid at 16. See also ibid at 14, 17.
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it, not only re-draw state borders but also redistribute the rights and relations 
produced on either side of those borders.52
In the context of refugee law, moving borders are almost always enacted with 
the goal of limiting access to lawful migration and asylum and with the effect of 
restricting refugee rights.53 As Audrey Macklin explains, “since asylum seekers’ 
entitlement to claim refugee status is triggered by reaching the frontier of the 
asylum state, if the border is no longer the border, the state can deny responsibility 
for entertaining the refugee claim.”54 The MBS, for example, facilitates Canada’s 
ability to shift the locus of border control away from its territorial borders to 
what the CBSA describes as “the many, more effective, ‘borders’ that a traveller 
will pass through before reaching North America.”55 In doing so, the MBS allows 
Canada to subject refugees to inspection long before they set foot on Canadian 
soil and trigger the legal safeguards outlined in Singh. In the result, Canada acts 
as an “architect of statelessness”—to borrow Alison Mountz’s term—pushing 
migrants into intentionally ambiguous thresholds where their legal status and 
entitlements can more easily be denied.56
52. Huyen Pham, “When Immigration Borders Move” (2009) 61:5 Fla L Rev 1115 (examining 
the significance of moving border laws in the context of United States immigration law).
53. As Shachar further explains, moving borders allow states to enforce “the sovereign prerogative 
to deny or permit access in a whole new way: by redrawing (indeed, redefining) the once 
fixed and static territorial border, transforming it into something more malleable and 
movable, which can be placed and replaced – by the words of law – in whatever location 
that best suits the goals of restricting access.” Shachar, supra note 10 at 811. For a discussion 
of how moving border laws impact asylum seekers, see e.g. Gerald Kernerman, “Refugee 
Interdiction Before Heaven’s Gate” (2008) 43:2 Government and Opposition 230; Lori 
A Nessel, “Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee” (2009) 40:3 Colum HRL Rev 
625; Lory Diana Rosenberg, “The Courts and Interception: The United States’ Interdiction 
Experience and Its Impact on Refugees and Asylum Seekers” (2003) 17:2 Geo Immig LJ 199.
54. Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third 
Country Agreement” (2005) 36:2 Colum HRL Rev 365 at 369.
55. OAG 2003 Report, supra note 7 at 8.
56. Alison Mountz, Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) at 167, 172 [Mountz, Seeking Asylum]. 
See also Alison Mountz, “Shrinking Spaces of Asylum: Vanishing Points Where Geography Is 
Used to Inhibit Access to Asylum” (2013) 19:3 Austl J HR 29.
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III. CIRCUMVENTING RESPONSIBILITY
By “push[ing] the border out,”57 Canada engages in a range of activities that 
not only block refugees but also sidestep Canada’s legal responsibilities towards 
refugees under domestic and international law. For example, Canada positions 
Liaison Officers in several refugee-producing countries around the world and 
tasks them with intercepting refugees and other so-called “irregular” migrants 
before they board Canada-bound boats or planes.58 Canada currently positions 
Liaison Officers in forty-seven countries around the world.59 As Mountz explains, 
while Liaison Officers have “little to no jurisdiction,” they “act informally as 
liaisons between foreign embassies, private security companies at airports, 
airlines, and host authorities” and facilitate Canada’s ability to block refugees 
offshore.60 Indeed, according to the CBSA, the Liaison Officer Program “has 
strengthened the CBSA’s capacity to interdict irregular migrants overseas.”61 
The Program has proven an effective interdiction measure: between 2001 and 
2014, Liaison Officers intercepted over 86,000 persons offshore, many of whom 
were likely refugees.62 Because they operate outside state soil, Liaison Officers 
can more easily circumvent Canada’s refugee protection obligations. They are 
not required to consider the individual circumstances of interdicted individuals, 
57. CBSA Admissibility Study, supra note 7 at “Overview of CBSA Admissibility Screening and 
Supporting Intelligence Activities.”
58. Canada Border Service Agency, “Fact Sheet: CBSA International Network” (June 2012) at 
para 2, online: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130425110301/http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/
media/facts-faits/113-eng.html> (explaining as follows: “The Government of Canada began 
deploying migration officers overseas in 1989, and the network has continued to evolve to 
meet changing global priorities and threats. In spring 2011, the CBSA began to expand the 
scope of its international network to better reflect the full spectrum of the Agency’s mandate. 
With this new expanded profile, migration integrity officers (MIOs) were renamed CBSA 
liaison officers”), cited in Arbel & Brenner, supra note 5 at 29, n 55.
59. For an overview of Liaison Officers located abroad see Canada Border Service Agency, Guide 
for Transporters: Obligations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2012), 
online: <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/pub/bsf5023-eng.html#a4> (listing 
locations and operations of Liaison Officers abroad).
60. Mountz, Seeking Asylum, supra note 53 at 137.
61. Canada Border Services Agency, Departmental Performance Report (2005-2006), online: 
<www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071126140658/http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/
dpr-rmr/0506/bsa-asf/bsa-asf_e.pdf>.
62. For statistics between 2001–2011, see Arbel & Brenner, supra note 5 at 34. Statistics for 
2012–2014 were obtained through Freedom of Information Request A-2014-13676/ MB, 
completed 29 July 2015, current to November 2014.
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to differentiate between refugees and other travellers, or to ensure that intercepted 
individuals are not sent back to their countries of origin to face persecution.63
Offshore interdiction works in tandem with carrier sanctions and visa 
restrictions—also operative along the MBS’s external borders—to keep countless 
more refugees at bay.64 Canadian law prohibits carriers “from carrying to Canada 
any person who does not hold the prescribed documents required for entry 
into Canada.”65 Failure to meet this requirement can result in the imposition of 
significant fees.66 Consider, for example, the 2004 decision of the Federal Court 
63. See Andrew Brouwer, Attack of the Migration Integrity Specialists!: Interdiction and the 
Threat to Asylum, Canadian Council for Refugees (29 May 2003), online: <ccrweb.ca/
interdictionab.htm> (providing details about offshore interdiction, noting that liaison officers 
seldom differentiate between refugees and other migrants, and explaining how interdiction 
violates international law).
64. For discussion of how interdiction policies operate in tandem, see John Morrison & Beth 
Crosland, “The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The End Game in European Asylum 
Policy?” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Working Paper No 39 (April 
2001) at 28, online: <www.unhcr.org/3af66c9b4.pdf> (noting that “[t]he imposition of visa 
restrictions on all countries that generate refugees is the most explicit blocking mechanism 
for asylum flows and it denies most refugees the opportunity for legal migration.”)
65. Canada Border Services Agency, Guide for Transporters: Obligations Under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (2012), online: <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/pub/
bsf5023-eng.html>. While Canada has imposed such sanctions on carriers since the early 
1980s, it has retooled their use as interdiction measures in recent years. See François 
Crépeau & Delphine Nakache, “Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada: Reconciling 
Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection” (2006) 12:1 Immigration and Refugee 
Policy Choices 3 at 13 (explaining how various Canadian migration mechanisms have been 
retooled as interdiction measures). For discussion, see Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, 
“Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide” (2003) 
21:4 Refuge 6 at 9 (explaining how carrier sanctions work in concert with visa requirements 
as interdiction measures).
66. The fee obligations are delineated in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 
SOR/2002-227, ss 278-80. See also IRPA, supra note 14, s 148. Carriers may be charged 
an administrative fee of up to $3,200 per foreign national and may also be charged for 
associated removal costs including expenses incurred for accommodation and transport, 
associated fees, medical expenses, translation services, meals, and incidentals. Section 279 
of the Regulations establishes the procedure by which an administrative fee is assessed 
and outlines exceptions. Section 280 of the Regulations outlines a range of administrative 
fees to be imposed on carriers, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, 
ranging from $0 to $3,200 depending on several criteria. For further discussion, see 
Mountz, Seeking Asylum, supra note 53 at 137 (explaining that carrier sanction programs 
exemplify the privatization of enforcement, since private companies are being paid by states 
to police borders, and also forced to pay states when they fail); Brouwer & Kumin, supra 
note 62 at 12-13 (explaining the carrier sanctions program, the procedure for imposing 
fees, and the procedure for entering pre-inspection agreements to allow for payment of 
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in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Canada, ordering KLM to pay $114,715.68 
for costs associated with a Somali national who came to Canada using a false 
passport on a KLM flight from Paris and who was eventually returned to France 
by the Canadian government.67 The threat of financial sanction creates incentives 
for airlines and other surrogate screeners to prevent travellers who lack proper 
identity documents from travelling to Canada without consideration of their 
potential status as refugees. Since Canada does not monitor the activities of 
surrogate screeners, it is difficult to know how many refugees are blocked as a result 
of this program. The evidence is clear, however, that private carriers sometimes 
engage in improper conduct to avoid incurring fees, including throwing refugees 
overboard mid-journey on the high seas to meet their death.68 In the Maersk 
Dubai incident, for example, officers of a Taiwanese vessel discovered Romanian 
men stowed away mid-journey on two separate voyages to Canada, two men on 
the first voyage and one on the second.69 The officers were accused of throwing 
the men overboard, ostensibly to avoid paying carrier sanctions.70 In a United 
States case involving a similar scenario, the Chinese crew of a Panama-flagged 
vessel departing from the Dominican Republic found five men stowed away 
on board and, in an effort to avoid financial sanction, threw two of the men 
overboard and left three on a life raft in the middle of the ocean.71 The men in 
the raft were saved by another vessel, and the shark-eaten bodies of the two men 
thrown overboard were found sometime later.72
Canada also has a long history of imposing visa requirements on countries 
that produce large numbers of refugees, particularly during times when refugee 
arrivals from a given country increase substantially.73 As James Hathaway and Alex 
reduced fees); François Crépeau, Delphine Nakache & Idil Atak, “International Migration: 
Security Concerns and Human Rights Standards” (2007) 44:3 Transcultural Psychiatry 
311 at 324 (noting that sanctions transfer migration management to private carriers who 
must make decisions on the travellers’ possession and authenticity of documents to avoid 
substantial fines).
67. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Canada (Solicitor General), 2004 FC 308, 48 Imm LR (3d) 28, 
cited and discussed in Rehaag, supra note 13 at 97.
68. Romania (State) v Cheng (1997), 158 NSR (2d) 13, 114 CCC (3d) 289 (SC).
69. Ibid at paras 1-4.
70. Ibid at para 1.
71. De Leon v Shih Wei Navigation Co, Ltd, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 49665 at 3-5, 2007 WL 
20121738, aff’d 2008 US App LEXIS 5464 (5th Cir Tex 2008).
72. Ibid.
73. See Arbel & Brenner, supra note 5 at 35-40 (outlining Canada’s visa policies and their impact 
on asylum seekers, and citing statements by Citizenship and Immigration Canada officials 
suggesting that stemming refugee flows is a central motivating factor in deciding when to 
impose visa requirements).
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Neve explain, since “a Canadian visa will not be issued for the purposes of seeking 
asylum in Canada, refugee claimants who are honest about their intentions will 
be denied the documentation necessary to come to Canada legally.”74 Identified 
by Hathaway as a “classic mechanism of non-entrée,”75 visa restrictions are often 
utilized as the “‘first line of defense’ against the entry of undesirables.”76 Canada 
has been candid in its position that visa requirements act as an effective way 
to stem refugee flows from certain source countries and save “considerable 
resources.”77 The Liaison Officer program, visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, and 
other interdiction measures work together to close Canada’s borders to refugees 
74. See also James C Hathaway & R Alexander Neve, “Fundamental Justice and the Deflection 
of Refugees from Canada” (1996) 34:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 213 at 223.
75. James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 291. As Hathaway explains: “Canada, for example, has long 
required the nationals of countries likely to produce refugees to obtain a visa before boarding 
a plane or otherwise coming to Canada.” Ibid at 291-92. The term “non-entrée” is coined to 
describe the array of legalized policies adopted by states to stymie access to refugees to their 
territories. See generally James C Hathaway, “The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée” (1992) 
91 Refugees 40 (describing terminology).
76. John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means 
of Movement’” (1998) 16:3 Sociological Theory 239 at 252 (explaining the operation of visa 
restrictions and passport requirements). For a discussion of how states use visa restrictions 
as instruments of interdiction, see e.g. Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 62; Ninette Kelley, 
“International Refugee Protection Challenges and Opportunities” (2007) 19:3 Int’l J 
Refugee L 401 at 421 (explaining the severe risk posed by visa restrictions, combined with 
offshore interdiction and document inspection programs, to asylum seekers in need of 
international protection).
77. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism: Final Report (Ottawa: 
CIC, 2003) at 4.2. For example, in July 2009, the Canadian government imposed visa 
requirements on Mexico and the Czech Republic. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
News Release, “Canada Imposes a Visa on the Czech Republic” (13 July 2009) [“CIC News 
Release, Czech Republic”], online: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130621075627/http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-07-13a.asp>; Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, News Release, “Canada Imposes a Visa on Mexico” (13 July 2009) 
[“CIC News Release, Mexico”], online: <https://web.archive.org/web/20131222203953/
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-07-13.asp>. See 
e.g. “CIC News Release, Mexico”, ibid (citing Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and 
Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stating: “The visa requirement I am announcing will give us 
a greater ability to manage the flow of people into Canada and verify bona fides. By taking 
this important step towards reducing the burden on our refugee system, we will be better 
equipped to process genuine refugee claims faster.”) See also “CIC News Release, Czech 
Republic”, ibid.
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such that, as Sharryn Aiken notes, “vast numbers of bona fide refugees are being 
caught up in the web of immigration control with devastating results.”78
Measures that “push the border out” are legally problematic in that they also 
push Canada’s interdiction activities outside the ambit of Charter review and leave 
those who are subject to them with little to no legal recourse. While Canadian 
law is still murky with respect to the Charter’s extraterritorial application, the 
Supreme Court of Canada made clear in R v Hape that Canadian officials 
operating outside of Canada are largely exempt from constitutional scrutiny.79 
Hape created what Kent Roach has described as extra-territorial “Charter-free 
zones.”80 As regards individual applicants, the Court held in Canada v Khadr 
that the protection of the Charter can extend beyond Canada’s borders where 
fundamental human rights are at stake, but only, it seems, in cases involving 
Canadian citizens.81 Other courts have held that non-citizens off state soil can 
claim the Charter’s protection only if they can “establish a nexus to Canada,” 
for example by being subject to a criminal trial.82 Otherwise, the courts have 
held that the Charter does not apply extraterritorially to “foreigners, with no 
attachment whatsoever to Canada or its laws.”83
Given that fundamental human rights are always at stake when a refugee flees 
persecution, what kind of nexus or “attachment … to Canada or its laws” must a 
78. Sharryn Aiken, “Racism and Canadian Refugee Policy: Diverse Perspectives on Refugee 
Issues” (1999) 18:4 Refuge 1 at 6.
79. R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para 14, [2007] 2 SCR 292 (finding that “international 
customary law and the principle of comity of nations generally prevent the Charter from 
applying to the actions of Canadian officials operating outside of Canada”).
80. Kent Roach, “R v. Hape Creates Charter-Free Zones for Canadian Officials Abroad” (2007) 
53:1 Crim Law Q 1 (analyzing the Hape decision). See also Amnesty International Canada 
v Canada (Chief of the Defense Staff), infra note 80 (finding that while Canadian Forces can 
exercise power beyond state borders, they are not circumscribed by the Charter while abroad).
81. Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at para 14, [2010] 1 SCR 44 (finding that in 
circumstances where “Canadian participation in activities of a foreign state or its agents that 
are contrary to Canada’s international obligations or fundamental human rights norms”, the 
Charter can apply abroad). Similarly, the Federal Court has been consistent in its position 
that “Charter protections may be available to non-Canadians when they are physically 
present in Canada, subject to a criminal trial in Canada, and that Canadian citizens, 
in certain circumstances, may assert their section 7 Charter rights when they are outside 
Canada”, and dismissing the claim on grounds that the applicants “have failed to establish 
a nexus to Canada that would engage their section 7 Charter rights.” Slahi, supra note 29 
at paras 47-48. See also Kinsel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1515, 
[2014] 2 FCR 421.
82. Slahi, supra note 29 at para 48.
83. Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Chief of the Defense Staff), 2008 FCA 401 at para 
14, [2009] 4 FCR 149, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 33029 (21 May 2009).
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refugee establish to benefit from the Charter’s protection offshore? By the Court’s 
logic in Singh, physical presence at (one of ) Canada’s borders should be enough. 
Indeed, if the extraterritorial borders drawn by the MBS are to function as true 
borders—as the MBS asserts—Singh would prescribe that a refugee’s presence 
at any of these borders makes him amenable to Canadian law and therefore 
entitles him to Charter protection. By this logic, a refugee stopped by a Liaison 
Officer at one of the MBS’s legal borders should be able to assert the protections 
outlined in Singh. The same should apply for a refugee subject to visa restrictions 
or carrier sanctions.84
The MBS negates this possibility, however, by enacting the border in 
two fundamentally different ways. On one hand, it redefines the border as a 
shifting, multiple continuum that extends extraterritorially. On the other hand, 
it conceives of the border as a singular static line positioned along Canada’s 
cartographic boundary line and asserts this as the “actual” border.85 Herein lies 
the core contradiction underpinning the MBS: it simultaneously asserts Canada’s 
extraterritorial borders as real borders, while maintaining the fiction that they 
are not actual borders. By constituting the border as at once static and shifting, 
the MBS places refugees in an intractable legal position. It suspends refugees 
between two contradictory directives: It requires them to present themselves at 
the “actual” border to claim the legal protections outlined in Singh, but also shifts 
the border to confound their ability to do so. Canada uses the MBS to subject 
refugees to the force of Canadian law but avoid the obligation to extend refugees 
the legal and constitutional duties triggered by physical presence along the actual 
border. This fundamentally undermines Singh, weakening both the protection it 
affords to refugees and its broader legal and normative force.
IV. UNDERMINING THE “RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS”
The effects that flow from the MBS’s operation are profound and are helpfully 
illuminated by reference to the work of Hannah Arendt. In particular, her 
analysis of the “right to have rights”86—which, as Dana Schmalz writes, has 
become an “almost unavoidable reference” in discussions of refugee rights and 
84. Such a reading accords with Galloway’s analysis, supra note 32.
85. The MBS does this explicitly, by stating that the strategy’s goal is to intercept migrants “as 
far away from the actual border as possible, ideally before a person departs their country of 
origin.” OAG 2003 Report, supra note 7 at 8 [emphasis added].
86. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12.
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the boundaries of law—highlights the legal and conceptual violence ushered in 
by the MBS’s subversion of Singh’s core principles.87
Arendt’s discussion of the right to have rights powerfully captures the legal 
and political loss suffered by the figure of the refugee.88 She introduces the right 
to have rights briefly in The Origins of Totalitarianism, defining it rather vaguely 
as the right “to belong to some kind of organized community” and to “live in 
a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions.”89 In Origins, 
she explains that the world first became aware of the existence of the right to 
have rights as a result of its deprivation—when, during the First World War 
and its aftermath, European nation-states denationalized and deported millions 
of unwanted minorities, disentitling them from legal and political membership. 
Left with no government to represent them, the “new refugees” were rendered 
stateless and deprived of meaningful rights protection.90 In Arendt’s analysis, 
statelessness was produced by a confluence of various conditions: the lack of 
coordination between states, the thoughtless application of denationalization and 
87. Dana Schmalz, Book Review of Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of 
Freedom by Christian Volk, (2015) 13:4 Int’l J Const L 178 at 178.
88. Notably, while she used the term “refugees,” Arendt rejected the distinction between the 
various categories of displacement (refugees, stateless persons, displaced persons, etc.). 
In Origins, she writes: “[t]he many and varied efforts of the legal profession to simplify 
the problem by sating a difference between the stateless person and the refugee – such as 
maintaining ‘that the status of a stateless person is characterized by the fact of his having 
no nationality, whereas that of a refugee is determined by his having lost diplomatic 
protection’ … were always defeated by the fact that ‘all refugees are for practical purposes 
stateless’.” Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 281, n 28. For further discussion, see Patricia 
Tuitt, “Refugees, Nations, Law and the Territorialization of Violence” in Peter Fitzpatrick 
& Patricia Tuitt, eds, Critical Beings: Law, Nation, and the Global Subject (London: Ashgate, 
2004) 37 at 37 (criticizing Arendt for focusing on the territorial refugee in her analysis of 
statelessness/rightlessness, and arguing that as a result Arendt conceptualizes “rightlessness 
in territorial terms, by assuming that displacement occurs outside one’s state,” and arguing 
instead that it is not the refugee but rather the “internally displaced” that disrupts the 
conventional nexus of state, identity, and territory).
89. Origins, supra note 12 at 296-97. While Arendt only discusses the right to have rights in 
Origins, her writing on political action in The Human Condition, 2nd ed (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998), discussed in the analysis below, helps illuminate the meaning and 
significance of the right.
90. Origins, supra note 12 at 296-97.
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expulsion policies, and the coercive application of identity politics within and 
between nation-states.91
Arendt suggests that the true loss refugees experienced stemmed not from 
their loss of nationality, home, or “social texture into which they were born,” 
for these losses were not unprecedented in human history.92 Nor was their loss 
experienced in the deprivation of life, liberty, or equality before the law, for these 
formulations were designed to provide protection to individuals within a legal 
order. Rather, as Bridget Cotter explains, Arendt claims that refugees suffered 
true loss in their expulsion from the legal and political order of organized states 
and in their concurrent loss of a political and juridical context in which their legal 
rights could be realized or enforced.93 This, in Arendt’s analysis, is what it means 
to be deprived of the right to have rights: to be denied a “place in the world” 
where one’s rights can be exercised and enforced and where one’s actions acquire 
meaning and significance.94
Building on these readings, my treatment of Arendt departs from critics who 
suggest that the right to have rights is a right of citizenship or national belonging. 
I analyze the right to have rights not as a status or entitlement, but as a process 
that is maintained through political action and is “rooted in the practices of 
91. Ibid at 296. For further discussion, see Judith Butler, “I Merely Belong to Them” Book 
Review of The Jewish Writings by Hannah Arendt, (2007) 29:9 London Review of Books 26 
at 26 (explaining that in Arendt’s conception, statelessness was more than the manifestation 
of mass displacement, but was the “recurrent 20th-century predicament of the nation-state”).
92. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 293.
93. Bridget Cotter, “Hannah Arendt and ‘The Right to Have Rights’” in Anthony F Lang, Jr & 
John Williams, eds, Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) 96 at 110.
94. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 293. For Arendt, the promise of rights protection is 
substantively meaningless if it is not accompanied by correlating duties of enforcement that 
make actions and opinions meaningful. As Jeffrey Isaac explains, Arendt’s analysis makes 
clear that “those very rights long considered universal and attached, as it were, to individuals 
by virtue of their very humanity, require for their existence institutional supports that 
are utterly contingent and by no means universal.” Jeffrey C Isaac, “Hannah Arendt on 
Human Rights and the Limits of Exposure, or Why Noam Chomsky Is Wrong about the 
Meaning of Kosovo” (2002) 69:2 Social Research 505 at 509. As Martha Minow explains, 
Arendt “celebrated politics as an area of action in which ‘people create, through words and 
deeds, the power they need to initiate new projects or response to shared predicaments’.” 
See Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and the Law (New York: New 
York Press, 1997), citing “Justice, Equality, Democracy” in Lewis P Hinchman & Sandra 
K Hinchman, eds, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1994) 257 at 258.
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rights-bearers themselves.”95 In Arendt’s analysis, the right to have rights depends 
on, and is realized through, one’s own contribution to the production and 
enforcement of rights through political action. It is for this reason that critics like 
Frank Michelman reject a reading that understands the right to have rights as 
comprised of two constitutive rights: a preliminary moral claim (right 1) to a set 
of legal or empirical rights (right 2).96 Michelman shows that Arendt “befuddles 
and collapses” any conceptual distinction between moral and empirical rights.97 
Instead, as James Ingram suggests, Arendt conceives of the right to have rights as 
a right that is sustained by a continuous process of action and exchange through 
which fundamental rights are negotiated and defined.98 Its realization, Arendt 
argues, hinges on the existence of a “place in the world” where one can contribute 
to the production and enforcement of rights through political action.99
In Arendt’s analysis, laws and constitutions are necessary to preserve a “place 
in the world.”100 Refugees who were denied a “place in the world” were cast 
“outside the pale of law” and rendered not just stateless but also rightless—a 
condition constituted by a loss of polity.101. Thus, in Arendt’s thinking, the role 
95. James D Ingram, “What Is a ‘Right to Have Rights’?: Three Images of the Politics of Human 
Rights” (2008) 102:4 Am Polit Sci Rev 401 at 402, 408, 412. This reading builds on Étienne 
Balibar’s equation of the right to have rights with a “right to politics.” See Étienne Balibar, 
Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx (London: 
Routledge, 1994). As Ingram explains: “Human rights are thus on [Balibar’s] account a 
principle internal to modern politics that always potentially exceeds the limits of any given 
political order or community. Because this ‘right to politics’ is a right to action, Balibar 
insists, it can only be ‘a right of everyone on his or her own behalf’ – which signifies, ‘among 
other things, that no one can be liberated or emancipated by others, from ‘above’.” Ingram, 
supra note 91 at 411 [emphasis in original].
96. See Frank I Michelman, “Parsing ‘A Right to Have Rights’” (1996) 3:2 Constellations 200.
97. Ibid at 203-04.
98. Ingram, supra note 91 at 408, 412
99. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 293.
100. Christian Volk, Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of Freedom 
(London: Hart, 2015).
101. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 268-69, 295.
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of law is not to enact or even guarantee the right to have rights.102 Rather, the 
role of law is to create a system that enables its constituents to engage in political 
action and participate in the production of rights.103 Law—as preserved and 
enshrined in constitutions—thus establishes essential foundations for the right 
to have rights.
Arendt’s analysis helps clarify the Court’s contribution in Singh. While Singh 
does not guarantee refugees broad Charter protection—or, for that matter, enact 
the right to have rights—it nonetheless extends them legal and constitutional 
recognition under Canadian law. Singh recognizes refugees as legal subjects and 
entitles them to participate in the adjudicative process that governs their rights 
102. Arendt herself, in fact, questioned whether enacting the right to have rights was possible. 
After introducing the right to have rights, Arendt states: “It is by no means certain whether 
this is possible. For, contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to obtain new 
declarations of human rights from international organizations, it should be understood that 
this idea transcends the present sphere of international law which still operates in terms of 
reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states; and, for the time being, a sphere 
that is above the nations does not exist.” Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 298-99. For an 
analysis of whether the right to have rights can ever be meaningfully implemented, see 
Judith Butler & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State?: Language, Politics, 
Belonging (New York: Seagull Books, 2007) at 65.
103. As Volk further demonstrates, in Arendt’s analysis, laws and constitutions provide the 
“enabling reasons” for political action. See Volk, supra note 95. In Arendt’s thinking, 
political actionwhich she viewed as the highest form of human activityboth embodies 
and enables human freedom, heroic action, self-invention, and creativity. Volk’s reading 
convincingly shows that Arendt sees the experience of political action as essential for 
freedom. Ibid at 230. Arendt further explains that for human action to truly flourish, human 
beings must live in a polity that is plural, equal, and diverse. Arendt constructs plurality and 
equality as mutually enforcing conditions. Through equality and distinction, she explains, 
human beings experience true freedom and development. Equality and distinction allow 
human beings to both express and be judged by their actions and opinionsthe markers 
that define “who,” not “what,” they are. See generally Arendt, The Human Condition, supra 
note 85. For further discussion on this point, see Morris B Kaplan, “Refiguring the Jewish 
Question: Arendt, Proust, and the Politics of Sexuality” in Bonnie Honig, ed, Feminist 
Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) 
105 (noting that Arendt saw self-formation as an inherently political process and saw 
identities as being formed by negotiation of a plurality of forces and relations).
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entitlements.104 By embracing them within the constitutional fold, it carves out a 
“place in the world” where, despite their non-membership in the national polity, 
refugees are recognized as juridical actors who possess a limited but actionable 
rights-claim against the state.105 In doing so, it establishes important legal 
foundations for the right to have rights in Canada’s constitutional framework. 
The MBS, however, allows Canada to banish refugees outside “the pale of law,”106 
or more accurately, outside the ambit of Canadian legal consideration. It denies 
refugees the place in the world that Singh ostensibly safeguards, by dismantling 
the legal and political context that enables refugee rights to be enforced and 
applied. Thus, the MBS does much more than re-chart Canada’s borders; it also 
alters the legal and constitutional entitlements of refugees present at those borders 
and undermines the legal foundations established in Singh for the realization of 
the right to have rights. Absent those legal foundations, the MBS allows Canada 
to avoid its legal and constitutional obligations and treat refugees not as juridical 
actors but as strangers whose rights can be ignored or denied. By depriving 
refugees of legal and constitutional recognition, the MBS leaves refugees in a 
state of suspended legal status, subject to the violence of our laws but denied the 
104. Notably there are several differences between the “right to have rights” and the principles 
outlined in Singh. First and foremost, Arendt conceives of the “right to have rights” as 
something that must exist independent of the nation-state structure. See Jeffrey C Isaac, “A 
New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human 
Rights” (1996) 90:1 Am Polit Sci Rev 61 at 71 (interpreting Arendt as implying that rights 
do not emerge from the nation-state or an international covenant or tribunal but rather 
“from the praxis of citizens who insist upon these rights and who are prepared to back up 
this insistence through political means.”). See also Butler & Spivak, supra note 97 at 32-35 
(analyzing Arendt’s understanding of the limitations of the nation-state structure and 
the role the nation-state plays in producing statelessness). Singh, in contrast, outlines an 
understanding of rights protection that is bound to and circumscribed by the nation-state. 
Second, Arendt conceives of the right to have rights as a principle that acquires juridical 
significance through correlating duties of enforcement that fall on the “whole of humanity.” 
This reading finds support in Arendt’s statements in the original preface to Origins where 
she suggests that the Rights of Man need “a new guarantee,” which can be “found only in 
a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend 
the whole of humanity.” Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at ix. The principles outlined in 
Singh, in contrast, acquire juridical significance through correlating duties that fall on the 
nation-state alone.
105. While refugees are formally entitled to the legal protections outlined in the United Nations 
Refugee Convention, once an individual is outside his or her country of origin, these rights 
are often difficult to enforce in practice. For discussion, see e.g. Catherine Dauvergne, “The 
Dilemma of Rights Discourses for Refugees” (2000) 23:3 UNSWLJ 56 at 57 (commenting 
on the “meagre” rights granted to refugees). Refugee Convention, supra note 14.
106. Arendt, Origins, supra note 12 at 277.
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protections of our constitutional documents. In this respect, the MBS signals a 
shift not just of policy but also of polity: its application reconfigures the “we” that 
are the subject of Canadian constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
With its reconstitution as a “smart” border and its transposition into the middle 
of non-jurisdictional political space, the Canadian border no longer functions as 
a site of rights protection for refugees. Rather, by redrawing its borders, Canada 
now frames new parameters of belonging that exclude some who were previously 
embraced within the constitutional fold. Take, for example, the case of Mr. K, 
an Iranian refugee persecuted for his pro-reform views, who fled Iran to seek 
refugee protection in Canada where his brother is a citizen.107 Mr. K flew from 
Iran to Moscow and then to Havana using false identity documents, intending 
to connect to Canada via Havana.108 A Canadian Liaison Officer stationed in 
Havana intercepted him and barred him from boarding his Canada-bound 
flight.109 Since Cuba is not party to the United Nations Refugee Convention, 
Mr. K could not seek refugee protection in Havana and was instead deported 
to Moscow. Before his deportation, with the assistance of his Canadian brother, 
he reached out to the Ottawa office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, which in turn reached out to counterparts in Moscow to seek their 
assistance. Despite these efforts, Mr. K was detained at Moscow International 
Airport, returned to Tehran, and arrested on arrival.110
When blocked by the Liaison Officer in Havana, Mr. K was physically 
present at one of Canada’s extraterritorial borders as drawn by the MBS and 
thus both amenable to and at the mercy of Canadian law. By Singh’s logic, 
this alone should have entitled him to the constitutionally protected right to 
basic legal recognition: to be recognized as a legal subject and appear before a 
Canadian adjudicator to advance his claim. But without access to the “actual” 
border, he could not claim the constitutional protections promised in Singh. 
Instead, he was intercepted, deported, and refouled to face the very persecution 
107. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 62 at 7 (discussing and reflecting on Mr. K’s story).
108. Recognizing that refugees often cannot secure original documentation while fleeing 
persecution, the United Nations Refugee Convention prohibits signatory states from imposing 
sanctions on refugees who use false documents to seek asylum. See Refugee Convention, 
supra note 14, art 21(1). This principle is incorporated into Canadian law in IRPA, supra 
note 14, s 133.
109. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 62 at 7.
110. Ibid.
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from which he fled. As a result, Mr. K was not only denied basic rights but also 
denied that “place in the world” where he could be recognized as a juridical actor 
and meaningfully participate in the legal and political process through which his 
rights were determined and defined. In Arendtian terms, Mr. K was denied not 
just rights but the right to have rights.
Mr. K’s story illuminates the core problems that stem from conceiving of 
the Canadian border as both static and shifting in a legal framework that limits 
the Charter’s extraterritorial reach. On one hand, in keeping with Singh, Canada 
purports to extend basic constitutional protection to refugees present at its borders 
and establish legal foundations that can enable the realization of Arendt’s right to 
have rights. But on the other hand, by “pushing the border out” and maintaining 
the fiction that its extra-territorial borders are not “actual” borders, Canada denies 
refugees present at those borders the protection Singh purportedly safeguards. 
In Mr. K’s case, due to the limited extraterritorial application of the Charter, 
the Liaison Officer responsible for Mr. K’s interception was largely exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny. And Mr. K himself was suspended in an exceptional 
state—subject to the force of Canadian law but denied legal and constitutional 
recognition.111 At all material times, Mr. K was unable to claim the benefit of the 
constitutional protections and commitments Singh purportedly enshrines.
As Mr. K’s story demonstrates, the MBS is fundamentally unprincipled: 
it treats refugees at our borders in a manner that is inconsistent with our own 
legal precedent and constitutional imperatives. Applying Arendt’s analysis to the 
MBS, it becomes clear that the violence ushered in by the MBS lies not only in 
denying refugees subject status in the eyes of the law; it also lies in the dismantling 
of one of our most progressive constitutional principles and in the concurrent 
weakening of our constitutional commitments.112 As a constitutionally minded 
nation, Canada has an obligation to regulate its borders in ways that reflect its 
111. For a discussion of how and when the Canadian border operates as a site of exception, see 
Efrat Arbel & Benjamin Goold, Not So Exceptional? Understanding the Canadian Border as a 
Place of Law [forthcoming, on file with authors].
112. Indeed, by adopting such an approach, we injure both refugees and our own constitutional 
order. As Volk explains, adopting a politics of exclusion negatively affects not just those 
who are excluded, but the constitutional order itself. Volk further reminds that the refugee 
represented for Arendt the “anomaly for whom the general law did not provide,” whose 
legal treatment undermined constitutionality itself. The refugee illuminates the “corruption 
of constitutionality,” as Volk terms it, whereby the “important decisions … [are] no longer 
taken within the constitutional framework.” See Christian Volk, “The Decline of Order: 
Hannah Arendt and the Paradoxes of the Nation-State” in Seyla Benhabib, ed, with the 
assistance of Roy T Tsao & Peter J Verovšek, Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 172 at 187-90, citing Arendt, Origins, 
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constitutional commitments. Indeed, for the Singh principle to retain meaning in 
Canada’s constitutional framework, Canada must ensure that the Charter extends 
not just to its territorial border but also its legal borders, wherever they may be 
drawn. If Canada de-territorializes the border, then it must also de-territorialize 
the constitution to ensure that refugees who are subject to Canadian law may 
also benefit from its protection. To do otherwise would be to adopt a duplicitous, 
unprincipled stance in our treatment of refugees at our borders and to erode 
one of the most progressive tenets of our constitutional system. It would be to 
undermine our long-standing tradition of leadership in refugee protection and to 
call into question Canada’s stated commitment to open our borders to those in 
need as well as its global reputation as a generous, hospitable nation.
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supra note 12 at 286 (elaborating upon how statelessness undermines the constitutional 
character of a political order).
113. OAG 2003 Report, supra note 7 at 8. For a more explicit rendering, see CBSA Admissibility 
Study, supra note 7 at “Overview of CBSA Admissibility Screening and Supporting 
Intelligence Activities.”
